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ABSTRACT
Privacy is increasingly getting importance in modern systems. As
a matter of fact personal data are out of the control of the original
owner and remain in the hands of the software-systems producers.
In this new ideas paper we drastically change the nature of data
from passive to active as a way to empower the user and preserve
both the original ownership of the data and the privacy policies
specified by the data owner. We demonstrate the idea of active data
in the mobile domain.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, we are increasingly interacting and cooperating with
systems like mobile devices, smart watches, (autonomous) cars,
service robots, and so on. An average user of technology spends
one day per week with her devices and a constant use of internet
as reported by “Ofcom” [6]. We are also increasingly aware of
the risks and side effects of sharing our personal data. The EU
GDPR legislation for data protection [5] contributed to create such
awareness and introduced regulatory constraints to protect citizens.
Europe is at the forefront of the regulation and reflections on these
issues through its institutional bodies [24], as also testified by the
statement of Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’
Systems of the European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies: “the principle of human dignity, understood as the
recognition of the inherent human state of being worthy of respect,
must not be violated by ‘autonomous’ technologies”1.
However, in order to exploit the benefits and opportunities of
the digitalization, we are obliged to share some of our personal data.
The boundaries of this tradeoff are not well defined and citizens
are passive consumers: once on the network, personal data are out
of the control of the original owner and remain in the hands of the
(software-) systems producers.
As a result, privacy and trustability of (software) systems are
becoming fundamental aspects to be considered, particularly with
regard to meeting the expectations of end users. Various approaches
1https://ec.europa.eu/research/ege/pdf/ege_ai_statement_2018.pdf
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have been proposed to specify what can be done with data [29],
how to enforce privacy concerns [38], how to manage access con-
trol policies [29], how to deal with transparency and accountability
criteria in software development, e.g., [4, 7, 19, 24, 30], and so on.
Unfortunately, these approaches may only partially solve the data
management issue. For what concerns the protection of data con-
fidentiality, data encryption techniques enable the translation of
sensible data into unreadable code, which can be accessible only
by people having a secret key or password [17]. Even though en-
cryption is a must-have element in any security strategy, it is not
enough when the need is to fine-grain govern data usage.
Current practices for managing personal information neglect
the rights of the user to fully express her desires and exert her
control on how and by whom her data are used, as testified in this
study made in mobile apps domain [36]. According to a survey
conducted among adult Americans [27], 91% of participants believe
that consumers have lost control over how personal information is
collected and used by companies, and that most participants would
like to do more to protect their personal information.
So far, data have always been considered as passive entities car-
rying digitized information on which operations can automatically
be performed by computer machines. The logic that controls the
life-cycle (e.g., creation, manipulation and destruction) of data is
decoupled from the data itself, and the owner of the data often
loses control over her data. In this paper, we propose to drastically
change the nature of data from passive to active, by introducing
the concept of active data. This technology empowers and protects
citizens and their personal data. An active data is a software mod-
ule that wrap, encapsulate, and protect personal data. Active data
mediates the access to personal data via well-defined interfaces,
forbids any different and direct access while preventing any unau-
thorized use. Moreover, active data embodies monitor and enforcer
technology to both guarantee the preservation of privacy policies
specified by the owner, and enforce actions that are needed in order
to satisfy her privacy desiderata.
2 STATE OF THE ART AND RELATEDWORKS
As exhaustively analyzed in [8], typically, systems make choices
on behalf of the user without caring about the user desiderata.
The specification of privacy preferences has been largely studied
at various levels, including requirements, specifications, coding, and
cognitive [13, 35, 41]. The Privacy-by-Design approach permits to
design privacy-preserving systems by adhering to certain principles
provided by high-level guidelines [1–3, 22, 29, 40]. The core idea
behind these principles is that data protection should be proactive,
i.e., capable of acting before any issue arises [14].
Privacy in mobile apps is a central aspect to be considered es-
pecially when concerning the expectations of end users [41]. Due
to the rigidity of the permission models adopted by the different
mobile platforms, e.g., Android by Google and iOS by Apple, end
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users are confined into a secondary role, having the only option
of choosing between either privacy or functionalities, as desirable
trade-offs are not allowed. The work in [36] proposes Android Flex-
ible Permissions (AFP), a user-centric approach that empowers end
users to specify and customize fine-grained permission levels ac-
cording to their own subjective privacy concerns. Authors in [37]
conducted a large-scale empirical study to investigate how end
users perceive the new run-time permission system of Android;
results suggest that privacy-related concerns are widespread.
Major parts of the GDPR require systems to account for how
personal information, and any information derived from it, moves
and get stored within computer systems. For instance, it demands
to keep track of with whom data gets shared (article 15(1)(c)) as
well as to identify all data associated to or deriving from individuals
(article 15(3)). Information-Flow Control (IFC) [34] is a promising
technology for the active data management. IFC permits to obtain
guarantees of many of the GDPR requirements related to how
private information gets handled and disseminated within systems.
IFC was originally conceived to confine sensitive information in
operating systems [11, 25, 42] but it has also been used to secure
web browsers [9, 39] and many programming languages [28, 33].
Moreover, the right to be forgotten (article 17) by erasing subjects
data can also be formulated as an IFC problem [23].
Blockchains might be employed to secure personal data against
tempering and revision [45]. A blockchain consists of data-structure
blocks stored in a decentralized architecture consisting of poten-
tially infinite number of nodes. Each node has a copy of the blockchain.
Whenever new transactions occur, the consensus of all the nodes is
needed in order to add the new block into the blockchain. Thus, each
transaction is held by the entire network and if someone attempts
to cheat the system, she can be easily identified. A blockchain might
be seen as an append-only database, which provides users with sev-
eral data protection properties including immutable data storage,
and secure time-stamping. The data immutability characteristic
of blockchain technologies put them in collision with the right to
be forgotten pillar of GDPR. To reconcile such an idiosyncrasy, a
viable solution would be to encrypt personal data before writing it
to a blockchain. Thus, the right to be forgotten can be applied by
destroying the keys that are needed to make data readable again.
Even though this represents a viable solution from a technical point
of view, regulators should accept that destroying keys actually
represents data erasures for the purpose of the GDPR2.
In recent years, the Diaspora [12] and Mastodon [44] social
networks have emerged, both based on the idea of adopting decen-
tralization to protect users’ privacy. Rather than using a centralized
architecture, resulting in users’ data being in the hands of a single
entity, they rely on a decentralized network of independent, feder-
ated servers that are administrated by individual users. End-users
can choose which servers to connect to and their data is shared
exclusively with the selected ones. Differently from us, the own-
ership of the data is not maintained. Moreover, active data are not
restricted to the social network domain.
In [21], authors propose Vanish, an approach aiming at protect-
ing the privacy of archived data against accidental, malicious, and
2http://cryptotimes.org/blockchain/right-forgotten-becomes-possible-
blockchain/
Personal data
I/O operations Internal operations
APIs
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Enforcer
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Figure 1: Active data module
legal attacks. The proposed system is based on cryptographic tech-
niques, which ensure that all the copies of certain data become
unreadable after a user-specified time.
The work in [31] makes data unrecoverable after a given ex-
piration date. Instead of destroying data when due, Ephemerizer
supports the creation of keys used for data encryption and decryp-
tion, and automatically destroys them at the appropriate time.
3 ACTIVE DATA
As anticipated in the introduction, we aim at changing the nature
of data from passive to active. The idea is to encapsulate, wrap, and
protect personal data inside an “active data module” (see Figure 1).
The module encloses personal data after being suitably encrypted
with state-of-the-art encryption techniques. The module offers I/O
operations that provide mediated access to the personal data when,
e.g., making a copy, modifying, and sharing. Internal operations
serve to actually operate on the personal data, from creation to
destruction, to usage. The privacy rules defined by the owner of
the personal data are then evaluated according to the information
available in the life-cycle status. Rules are defined in HyperLTL [15]
since, differently from traditional specification, capturing privacy
policies requires logic that is capable to relate many execution
traces of software [16]. We are working on providing user-friendly
and easy ways for specifying privacy policies in a correct way, e.g.
by exploiting the idea of property specification patterns [10, 18].
The life-cycle status component contains variables to keep trace
of the life cycle of the active data, e.g., number of data visualiza-
tions, number of copies of the data, accessibility right, creation and
expiration dates, origin of the data (art. 15(1)(g) of [5]), but also
where it can safely flow and be shared (art. 15(1)(c) of [5]). The
status may also contain information about the context of use, such
as the location-based information where the data is accessed, the
device that is used to read the data and, in general, any information
that allows the run-time evaluation of privacy preferences. Status
information that has to be shared and synchronized among multi-
ple instances of the same data (e.g., number of existing copies) is
stored remotely, while locally preserving a logical link to it. This
concept will be clearer in the following when we will explain how
we keep trace of the copies, sharing, etc. The satisfaction of the pri-
vacy rules is guaranteed by the monitor and enforcer components,
which continuously check and update the life-cycle status to detect
and possibly solve problems before privacy violations.
In order to control the access and to manage the life-cycle of
all the copies of the personal data that have been created also via
sharing, e.g., in social networks, we introduce the concept of active
data network. An active data network is a graph that is created when
an owner of a personal data decides to protect and control the data
by encapsulating it inside an active data module. For instance, in
the mobile domain this would be done through a dedicated Active
Data app, as described in Section 4. A node consisting of an instance
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Figure 2: A box and line view of the architecture and its components.
of the active data module in Figure 1 is created and this node plays
the primary role of owner node, i.e., it is the root of the just created
personal data flow. As shown in Figure 2, an active data network is
a hierarchical P2P network. When an active data module is shared, a
new instance of the active data module is created and connected to
the active data network by following a parent-to-child relationship.
The owner node acts as:
• Intrusion detection & prevention system – It implements an
intrusion detection and prevention system to monitor the
active data network activity and detect possible intrusions.
It uses network behaviour analysis to monitor inbound and
outbound activities to protect the peers from attacks [32].
• Active data network manager – It keeps trace of its own
active data network. It enables the update and change of pri-
vacy policies at any moment. Then, the policies are then dis-
tributed to the entire active data network. Note that, thanks
to the P2P architecture, the owner node does not need to be
always available and connected.
Similarly to the blockchain consensus protocols [43], within the
active data network all the nodes on a network are kept synchro-
nized with each other. Consensus means that the nodes on the
active data network agree on the same state. The consensus proto-
col prevents any single active data from controlling or derailing the
whole network. Differently from blockchain, we always keep the
owner of the data, which is the only one with the right to define
and/or change the privacy rules. Any node, upon performing an
operation, needs to check the status with the network, updates
will be propagated, and inconsistencies would lead to a temporary
block of the active data network, waiting for the owner node to
take suitable actions. The owner node has in fact the right for the
final consensus.
The active data network enables the owner to delete all the copies
of her active data (and the embedded personal data), at any time she
decides to enforce the right to be forgotten. In fact, the enforcers of
all the active data modules, by following the hierarchical parent-to-
child flow(s) imposed by the network, will order the self-destruction
of all of the active data copies by exploiting Internal operations
(see Figure 1). The owner node will self-destroy only after all of her
child nodes are self-destroyed. Obviously, it is impossible to force
the immediate destruction of an active data node that is offline: it
will be destroyed as soon as back online. At the moment, we rely on
encryption of the personal data as the main mechanism to protect
from hacking of the active data, for instance when the node hosting
the active data will be offline. At the end of this section, we briefly
describe sharding as a technique we are developing and we will
adopt to increase the level of security.
Sharding active data – The idea of sharding is to cut the per-
sonal data into chunks and distribute those encrypted “shards” to
various peers. Sharding might be found in technologies like P2P
network [26] and block-chain [20]. We are currently developing the
sharding technique in order to enhance the security of the personal
data. A number of replicas of each single “shard” are created in
order to avoid single point of failures, also considering that the
overall active data network is pretty volatile. Referring to Figure 1,
sharding implies that an active data, even the owner node, will only
contains a shard of the personal data, while the other shards are dis-
tributed in nodes of the active data network. Obviously, the higher
the number of shards, the higher security level can be reached. In
fact, this would require the consensus of n nodes of the active data
network in order to access the personal data, where n is the number
of shards that have been created. The undesired consequence here
is that it is not possible to access a personal data in the absence
of network connection, since locally only a single shard of the
personal data would be available.
4 ACTIVE DATA IN THE MOBILE DOMAIN
This section describes a scenario that illustrates active data at work
in the mobile domain. For the purpose of this paper, we decided to
target the mobile domain since, following the issues discussed in
Section 1, in this domain active data will bring clear and tangible
benefits to end users. That being said, one way to introduce active
data in this domain is to provide end users with an Active data
app capable of transforming any data they might want to share
from their phone into its active counterpart. Fundamentally, the
app is a container for active data; it also offers intrusion detection
& prevention while managing the data flow(s) network for those
data it is the owner of.
Figure 3: Scenario describing active data at work in the mobile domain
Alice wants to share MyFile.txtwith Bob. She opens the Active-
Data app on her smartphone and loads the file (label 1 in Figure 3),
with the intent of creating a new active data. Being concerned about
her privacy, during the active data creation process, she decides
to set a rule for stating that her file can only be opened by Bob
(2). An active data MyFile.active is created by active data app,
embedding into it MyFile.txt and the privacy rules she specified.
The active data is given back to Alice (3), in turn identified as the
owner node of it. Alice can now share the active data with Bob (4)
over conventional communication channels (e.g., text messaging,
e-mail). Upon receiving the active data, Bob opens it in his Active
Data app (5). The app then establishes communication with the
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other nodes in the active data network, currently represented only
by Alice (6). Each involved node verifies the validity of Bob’s access
attempt against the privacy rules. In the case of reaching a consen-
sus on the validity of Bob’s request, the status of the active data is
updated and Bob can successfully view Alice’s personal data (7).
The day after, Bob forwards the active data to Charlie (8), and
it is loaded into his Active Data app (9). Again, the Charlie’s app
establishes a communication with the other nodes currently in the
active data network – now both Alice and Bob (10). Since the con-
sensus on the validity of Charlie’s access attempt is not reached, his
request is denied (11), and the received active data is automatically
destroyed.
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORKS
Current work focuses on prototyping a first complete version of
active data in the mobile domain to calibrate the amount of runtime
support needed to provide the level of protection implied by the
user defined rules. Indeed, it is possible to categorize active data
depending on the amount of information that constitutes the active-
data’s status on which privacy rules predicate. Moreover, we will
perform extensive evaluation on the performance and scalability
of the approach.
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